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Abstract: 
Employment generation should be a high priority for European policy makers, in particular in light of the 
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ciris. Using the Cambridge Alphametrics Model (CAM) this paper compare and contrasts two policy scenarios: 
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scenario.  
 
Keywords: Austerity, employment, GDP growth, EU budget, investment, government spending, global 
financial crisis. 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), and in 
particular Dr. Ernst Stetter, for its support. 
 
Corresponding auhtor: Giovanni Cozzi. Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Greenwich, Old 
Royal Naval College, 30 Park Row, London SE10 9LS, email: g.cozzi@greenwich.ac.uk 
Terry McKinley: Director, Centre for Development Policy and Research, SOAS, University of 
London 
Jo Michell: Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of the West of England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Employment generation should be a high priority for European policy makers, particularly in 
light of the unbearably high levels of unemployment levels in many countries in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis.  
Whilst main economic commentators have attribute the problems of Europe, and in 
particular of the Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) to fiscal profligacy, 
private overspending and labour market bottlenecks a number of commentators have 
highlighted the structural and systemic nature of the crisis that is afflicting Europe. 
In particular, these commentators highlight how the cause of economic stagnation and 
unemployment in Europe rests primarily on the shift of economic policy priorities from a 
commitment towards full employment to an excessive focus on price inflation, financial 
market liberalisation and labour market flexibility in Europe since the early 1980s. 
In such a context, fiscal policies have been perceived by the majority of economists as 
a mere tool to balancing budget rather than functioning as an effective stabilization 
mechanism and countercyclical tool. This position had severe negative consequences for 
aggregate demand in several European countries.  Europe has become an area of severe 
imbalances with Germany on the one hand having significant current account surpluses and 
on the other South Europe financing these surpluses with their current account deficits. 
The recognition of the structural and systemic nature of the economic problems faced 
by Europe lead to a firm rejection of austerity policies and increased labour market flexibility 
as a tool to restore economic growth, create jobs and reduce government debt and budget 
deficits. Instead, it is increasingly argued that the way out of the crisis and economic 
stagnation in Europe is through the adoption of a much more expansionary macroeconomic 
framework both at national and at European levels. 
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Using the Cambridge-Alphametrics global macroeconomic (CAM) model this paper explores 
the economic feasibility of such an expansionary macroeconomic policy scenario as an 
alternative to current austerity policies. Based on the existing debated on alternative policy 
proposals for Europe, paper compares and contrasts two policy scenarios: an austerity 
scenario and an employment-focused scenario.  
In the baseline scenario we assume that the current basic direction of austerity policies 
is maintained through 2030. This implies reduced government expenditure and increased 
government revenue to slush down budget deficits and reduce government debt below the 
60% as GDP threshold. On the other hand, in the employment-focused scenario we assume 
increases in government expenditure, government income and private investment through 
2030 as the strategic basis to generate substantial increases in GDP and employment in 
Europe. The scenario also assumes that the European budget will be gradually scaled up and 
directed to spur public and private investment across Europe, and particularly in the Eurozone 
periphery. Finally, in order to deal with the problem of debt overhang in the Eurozone 
Periphery we assume that existing sovereign debt above 60% of GDP is pooled into a 
European Redemption Fund in order to reduce interest rate payments and free up additional 
resources. 
In order to carry out comparative analysis, we divide Europe into five blocs: 
Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), Core Eurozone (Germany, Belgium, 
France, Luxemburg and The Netherlands), Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal), East Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia), and the United 
Kingdom. 
We believe that this paper represents first and original attempt to quantify and assess 
the economic feasibility of a coherent set of alternative economic proposal for Europe. 
Whilst, there has been an intense discussion on alternatives to austerity there has not been a 
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systematic assessment of the impact of such policies in the medium to long-term period in 
Europe. This paper moves towards this direction and aims at filling this gap. 
Results generated by the CAM model for these two scenarios show that European 
nations would experience significantly higher growth and employment rates under the 
expansionary employment-focused scenario compared to the austerity scenario. Furthermore, 
projections of government net lending/net borrowing for the employment focused scenario 
show for the majority of the European blocs reductions to levels below 1% of GDP by 2030. 
As such, this strategy cannot be dismissed on the basis of fiscal irresponsibility. 
In addition, the combination of higher economic growth and the implementation of a 
European debt redemption mechanism lead to a significant reduction in debt as percentage of 
GDP for the highly indebted European countries. The debt reduction under the employment-
focused scenario results to be much more significant than the austerity scenario. 
The paper concludes by stressing that such alternative employment-focused recovery 
strategy is indeed feasible and produces more positive results than the current austerity policy 
scenario, not only in terms of growth and employment but also in terms of debt reduction. 
However, we argue that this intervention implies substantial greater EU funding of public 
investment, greater lending for private investment and a strong debt redemption mechanism 
for the heavily indebted countries of the Eurozone Periphery. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the causes of the crisis in 
Europe and its policy responses, Section 3 explains in great detail the CAM model, Section 4 
highlights the core assumption of the austerity and employment-focused scenarios, Section 5 
present the macroeconomic results of the two scenarios under investigation and Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Cause of the Crisis in Europe and Policy Responses  
 
Europe is in its deepest crisis of the post-war Era. European economies face stagnation, rising 
unemployment and increasing divergence in trade competitiveness. Many economists and 
policy makers have attributed the problems of Europe, and in particular of the Eurozone 
peripheral countries to fiscal profligacy, private overspending and labour market bottlenecks 
(e.g. Corsetti and Dedola 2011, Dionysios et al 2012, Lane 2010 and Fabrizio and Mody 
2006).  
Confronted with sharply rising public debt levels and widening budget deficits, many 
of the weaker European countries have been compelled to implement harsh fiscal austerity 
policies. Across the Eurozone periphery, fiscal consolidation, in particular cuts to government 
expenditure on social programmes, have been presented as the only way for individual 
countries to bring government deficits and debt levels back within the limits imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact. In the UNITED KINGDOM, the coalition government has 
implemented swingeing public spending cuts and welfare reforms. 
However, it is becoming increasingly evident that austerity policies have not led to the 
promised results. Despite spending cuts and increases in taxations, government debt levels 
have continued to rise:  OECD figures show government debt to GDP ratios rising for Italy, 
from 126% in 2012 to 133% in 2013, for Spain from 85% to 92%, and for the United 
Kingdom from 88% to 92% over the same period. 
Unemployment, especially among the young, is at record levels and there appears 
little hope of improvement in the near-term, given the limited potential for economic growth.1 
                                                          
1 The 2013 Global Employment Trends report of the International Labour Organization 
predicts that continued recessionary conditions in Europe and other developed countries will 
result in high unemployment rates in the foreseeable future. For the period 2014 to 2016 
unemployment rate is forecast to remain at 8.4% in developing economies (including Europe) 
compared to a pre-crisis level of 6.7% in the early 2000s (ILO 2013). 
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Recent IMF World Economic Outlook estimates for the Euro area forecast average GDP 
growth of 1.4% for the period 2014-2018 compared to an average pre-crisis GDP growth of 
2.2%. In the United Kingdom, growth rates for the same period are predicted to be slightly 
higher at around 2%, however this growth appears to be based on the shaky foundations of 
increases in debt-financed private consumption. 
The response of the majority of economists and policy makers to the dire economic 
situation and projected negative trends in employment and growth across Europe is that 
appropriately paced fiscal consolidation should go hand in hand with “growth-enhancing” 
supply-side policies (Buti and Padoan 2012). To this end, a series of initiatives promoting 
“labour market flexibility” and downward wage adjustments have been advocated as a part of 
the structural reform package, with the stated aim of increasing growth and employment, 
whilst simultaneously correcting deficits (European Commission 2012). 
However, a minority of economists and policy makers have instead highlighted the 
structural and systemic nature of the crisis that has afflicted Europe. Economic stagnation and 
divergence in the European Union is not the result of fiscal irresponsibility and profligacy by 
peripheral European countries—in several of the years in the period before the crisis, 
Germany ran a larger deficit than Spain, Portugal or Italy. Italy and Spain ran a primary 
surplus for most of the 1990s and 2000s.   
Instead, the crisis and recession has its roots in the mercantilist trade policies pursued 
by Germany which, locked into a currency union and unable to adjust exchange rates, the rest 
of the Eurozone has been unable to resist. These fractures, exacerbated by the financial 
liberalisation which started in the 1980s and in the shift in economic policy priorities from a 
commitment to full employment, towards a focus on price inflation and labour market 
flexibility, finally erupted into full-blown crisis in the Eurozone in the aftermath of the sub-
prime meltdown in the US (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2011, Petit 2012, Bellofiore 2012).  
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Since the early 1980s, academic opinion shifted strongly against the use of fiscal policies as a 
stabilisation tool. Deficit spending is perceived as ineffective in affecting the level of 
economic activity and act as a countercyclical mechanism (Arestis and Sawyer 2010). The 
restriction of national fiscal policies has been particularly severe for the Eurozone. 
Limitations to national policy space have not been accompanied by the introduction of a 
significant and effective common fiscal policy at the European level. The Maastricht Treaty, 
which enshrined in law the basic economic principles of the common currency, and the 
various pacts that have followed, have insisted upon the role of coordination and monetary 
integration without any reference to a common fiscal policy (Petit 2012). 
As such, the size of the European budget has remained small at around 1 percent of 
combined EU member states’ GDP. Moreover, the EU budget must be balanced, is too small 
to operate as an effective stabilizer and can thus play no role as a counter-cyclical instrument 
(Arestis et al. 2001). Aside from the small proportion assigned to structural funds, the budget 
cannot provide for significant transfers between rich and poor nations of the union (Irvin and 
Izurieta 2011).  
Monetary union, by design, has thus removed three essential policy instruments from 
the domain of national policy makers: monetary policy, exchange rate management and fiscal 
policy, as well as serving to significantly weaken progressive labour and welfare policies 
(Irvin and Izurieta 2011). Thus, all costs of adjustment to the mercantilist policies adopted by 
Germany are forced onto the labour market of the peripheral countries. Recession is the only 
available mechanism in the face of the asymmetries embedded in the institutional 
arrangements of the Union (Lapavitsas et al. 2010). 
Despite the dominance of these pre-Keynesian views, a discussion on alternative 
policy proposals for an employment-focused economic recovery across Europe has emerged 
among progressive economists. These policies are based on the recognition that austerity 
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policies are detrimental for Europe and that jobs and growth are created only with the 
adoption of an expansionary macroeconomic framework. 
Examples of policy proposals include initiatives such as reconsideration of the role 
and size of the European budget. It is argued by Arestis and Sawyer (2010) that this should be 
increased to at least 4-5 percent of GDP of member states’ if monetary union is to be viable 
in the face of the inbuilt structural asymmetries. With such an expanded budget, the EU could 
allocate substantially greater investment funds to the peripheral countries on the basis of 
fiscal transfers from surplus European countries (McKinley et al 2013).  
A wide range of suggestions have also been put forward on how to stabilise debt 
markets for the peripheral Eurozone countries, centred on various types of joint issuance or 
guarantees of debt. To this end, the idea of a European Redemption Fund has been put 
forward by some economists in order to address the debt overhang faced by some Eurozone 
countries (e.g. Bofinger et al. 2012, Buchheit et al 2013). The main idea behind this fund is to 
reduce financing costs by accepting join and several liabilities and to pass the low interest 
rates on to participant countries when buying their debt in the primary market (Bofinger et al 
2012).  
An employment-focused recovery requires increases in both public and private 
investment and significant fiscal expansion at national level. To this end a series of initiatives 
such as enhancing the role and lending of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and national 
development banks, and a more efficient allocation of European Structural funds at national 
level could play a role in reversing the historically low level of investment across Europe 
(Griffith-Jones et al. 2012). Increases in EIB capital and a better allocation of EU structural 
funds could have significant leverage effects. For instance, Griffith-Jones et al (2012) 
demonstrates that a doubling of EIB capital could generate additional loans of around 95 
billion euros within two years from its increase. Further, a reallocation of 5 billion euros in 
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the EU structural funds as risk buffer would lead to an additional 10 billion euros annual 
lending from the EIB to finance infrastructure projects (project bonds) as well as promote 
innovation (Griffith-Jones et al 2012).  
In this paper we assess the economic viability of such an expansionary 
macroeconomic framework. Using the Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM) we explore a 
policy scenario for Europe which combines fiscal expansion at the country level with 
enhanced financial support from the EU budget. The objective of this policy scenario is to 
spearhead an employment-focused economic recovery. The outcomes are contrasted with a 
scenario of continued austerity policies in Europe. 
 
 
3. The Cambridge Alphametrics Model  
 
The Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM) is a global macroeconomic policy model 
developed by Francis Cripps. Much of the underlying methodology, in particular, the stock-
flow accounting methodology, originates in work done by Cripps in collaboration with 
Wynne Godley and others at the Cambridge Economic Policy Group in the 1970s (Cripps & 
Godley, 1976; Godley & Cripps, 1983). The CAM was originally developed for use by 
United Nations agencies, such as UNDP and UN DESA. The model was subsequently used 
as the basis for the EC FP7-funded project "AUGUR: Europe in the World in 2020". 
The CAM is designed for the purpose of generating long-term policy-oriented 
projections. Within the model, the global economy is divided into a number of blocs, each 
representing either a single country or a group of countries. Europe is divided into four blocs 
and one country: Core Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, and The 
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Netherlands), Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal), East Europe 
(Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), and the United Kingdom. 
At the centre of the model are a set of accounting identities which link the balance sheets of 
each geographical bloc via a structure of national and international cash flows. This 
accounting framework ensures that projection results are consistent both in terms of the 
internal bloc structure, and at the level of international transactions. The series of stock and 
flows which make up this accounting framework are populated with historical time-series 
data going back to 1970. These series are derived from a number of international 
macroeconomic datasets, primarily the Word Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
As well as domestic macroeconomic time-series data, the model includes detailed accounting 
of international trade, with separate series for trade in services, manufactures, commodities 
and agricultural. 
The accounting framework is used to project forward from the historical data, in such 
a way that resulting set of projected figures are stock-flow consistent, that markets clear or 
inventories accumulate and that total global trade shares sum to unity. Augmenting the stock-
flow accounting identities are a set of behavioural equations. The coefficients and fixed 
effects of these behavioural equations are mostly determined by regression analysis of the 
historical time series data, although in some cases it is necessary to impose coefficients on 
these equations where historical data does not expose statistically significant relationships 
where theory would lead us to expect them. 
It should be emphasised that the model assumptions, and in particular the behavioural 
equations, are not based on pricing behaviours derived from optimisation at the 
microeconomic level so that the system is always in transition towards some exogenously-
determined long-run equilibrium. In particular, the model does not assume that in the long 
run the world economy tends towards a situation of full-employment equilibrium. As such, 
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notions such as the natural rate of interest have little relevance since, even in the absence of 
trade imbalances or government deficits, there is no mechanism by which ex-ante desired 
saving and investment will become equal. Likewise, the notion of equilibrium real exchange 
rates have little meaning, other than in the very loose sense of being that rate at which, given 
all the other variables, the external flow position is in balance. Instead of tending towards 
some long-run equilibrium, the system exhibits path dependency: the long run position is thus 
determined by the current and future values of state variables. Policy decisions in the present 
can have permanent long-run effects on the outcome of the model.2  
The total number of equations in the model is very large, and includes series for many 
variables which do not directly concern us here, such as energy use, migration and others. It 
is thus not feasible to provide a full account of the model in this paper. Instead we describe 
the main accounting structures and highlight those behavioural assumptions which are of 
most relevance for the current exercise. 
A convenient starting point for a description of the model structure is given by the 
flow-of-funds accounting matrix shown in Table 1. This table makes use of the accounting 
framework developed by Godley & Lavoie (2007) to summarise the cash flow relationships 
which make up the CAM model.3 The four sectors which comprise each block—the private 
sector, the government, banks and the foreign sector—are each represented as a single 
column in the flow matrix. The rows of the matrix then represent cashflows arising either 
from real or from financial transactions. 
The matrix is divided into two main sections. Real transactions appear in the section 
above the row, “net financial balance” while financial transactions occur in the section below. 
The entries which appear in the “net financial balance” row are accounting memos which net 
out the real “sources” and “uses” of funds for each sector, to give total real borrowing or 
                                                          
2The model thus encapsulates Kalecki’s assertion that the long run is just the accumulation of a sequence of 
short-period positions. 
3See Michell (2012) for a concise overview of flow-of-funds accounting. 
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lending for each sector (or, in alternative terminology, the “net acquisition of financial 
assets”). Since all financial balances must sum to zero, and the banking system is assumed to 
operate as a pure intermediary—thus having a net financial balance of zero—this row 
captures the well-known macroeconomic accounting identity that the difference between the 
saving and investment of the private sector must equal the sum of the government fiscal 
position plus the trade balance: 
 
 (SI)=(GT)+(XM) (1) 
 
Each entry in the flow matrix each corresponds to a cash flow, denominated in inflation-
adjusted domestic currency prices. The sign of the entry in the matrix denotes whether the 
flow is a source or a use of funds—whether it is a source of income or a category of 
expenditure for real flows, and whether it corresponds to a liability or asset for financial 
flows. 
If we trace the real flows through the matrix starting with the top row, total income 
for the bloc is divided into private sector income, YP and government income (net taxes and 
transfers), YG. In the foreign sector, the trade balance and the balance of transfers and income 
are recorded separately. Since all international trade is accounted for in US dollars, these 
entries are divided by the real dollar exchange rate to give domestic currency values. The 
trade balance is composed of the sum of the balances of trade of services, manufactures, 
agricultural goods and raw materials which, for the sake of simplicity, are not shown 
separately. For the private and the public sector respectively, the real saving of the sector is 
given by the difference between income and consumption and government current 
expenditures respectively. The net financial balance for the private sector is then real saving 
minus investment, while for the government sector it is the same as real saving. Summing the 
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trade balance and the balance on current income and transfers gives us the current account, 
which is equal to the negative of the net financial position of the foreign sector. 
 
 
Table 1: Transactions and flow-of-funds matrix: sources +ve, uses -ve. 
 
 
 
The financial flows shown in the bottom half of the matrix are more straightforward. Each 
column of flows represents the sum of net acquisitions of financial assets and liabilities, and 
must thus sum to the net financial balance of the sector implied by the real sector financial 
position. The types of financial flows included in the model are listed at the left hand of the 
side of the matrix. Each transaction takes place between two sectors, with the exception of 
the issuance of government debt which may be held either by the private sector or the 
domestic banking system.4 Since the total net issuance of any type of financial liability must 
                                                          
4International holdings of public debt are not excluded, but are netted out from the international financial 
position of the private sector. 
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be matched by an equal accumulation as financial assets by other sectors, each row of the 
financial flow table must sum to zero. 
While these entries are mostly straightforward, one entry requires addition discussion: 
government asset transactions (IAGO). In terms of the historical data, this represents a 
residual category which captures the difference between reported net debt issuance, and the 
government deficit. In practice, this entry can include a large number of possible items, for 
example proceeds from privatisation of public assets, costs of bank recapitalisations and any 
other government asset transactions. The entry is thus required in order for the historical 
account to balance, but since there is little basis upon which to determine the size of this entry 
in the case of future projections, in the simulation exercises described in this paper we fix this 
entry to zero, effectively removing from the transactions matrix. This simplifies the 
accounting of the relationship between the government deficits, interest payments, and 
government debt, allowing for a clear interpretation of the results we present. However, it 
may imply that projected government debt levels are higher than what would actually be 
reported by governments, because the kinds of off-balance-sheet “window-dressing” 
operations which are capture by this item are regularly used by governments to reduce 
apparent levels of outstanding debt. 
Alongside this flow matrix, a balance sheet for each sector is maintained, with 
columns containing entries for the same macroeconomics sectors as in the flow matrix. The 
bloc balance sheet is shown in Table 2. The rows of the balance sheet are divided into three 
sections: real assets, financial assets and liabilities, and net worth. The first category contains 
only one item, the real capital stock of the private sector (which includes, for example, land, 
housing and all other tangible assets). The model thus abstracts from ownership of capital 
assets by government.5 The majority of the balance sheet is thus composed of financial assets 
                                                          
5This is primarily because of the lack of availability of data from which such a series could be constructed. 
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and liabilities. Each of these financial stocks corresponds to a flow entry in the transactions 
matrix. Finally there is a net worth entry for each sector: private wealth, WP, government net 
debt, NGF, and the net external position, NX$/rx, again accounted in dollars divided by the 
real dollar exchange rate. This corresponds to the “international investment position” reported 
in the accounts of the IMF and others. Accounting rules imply that a total net worth of the 
sector can thus be calculated, as shown in the bottom right of the table. 
Table 2: Stocks: assets +ve, liabilities -ve. 
 
These two tables summarise the main accounting framework of the system. In a world 
without price movements or debt defaults, these two tables would be all that is required to 
keep track of the stock-flow accounting. However, revaluations of positions due to price 
movements, and holding gains and losses on financial assets require another stage of 
accounting. In each period, the model accounting thus includes a step which revalues the 
previous end-of-period stocks before cumulating the current period flow. These revaluations 
are primarily driven by relative domestic and international price inflation and exchange rate 
movements. 
While the stock-flow-revaluation accounting serves to ensure the consistency of 
projections across sectors, blocs and time-periods, the outcomes of the model are driven by 
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the behavioural assumptions of model. In tables 1 and 2, a number of entries are shown in 
bold type. These denote those stocks and flows which are determined by behavioural 
equations rather than identities.  
These econometrically estimated behavioural equations take the same form for each 
of the blocs. The historical specificities of each bloc are captured by allowing the fixed 
effects of the behavioural equation to vary between blocs. While there is not sufficient space 
to describe these equations in detail here—the full model has around forty—it should suffice 
to say that there is a distinctly Keynesian flavour to the way that these relationships have 
been formalised. In particular, the model does not assume that an equilibrium interest rate 
relationship exists between saving and investment, so that the ex-ante values of these two 
variables can diverge, even in the long run. The equation for private sector saving calculates a 
propensity to save out of income, as a change on the previous period. Thus, saving 
propensities are assumed to change only slowly over time, influenced by private sector 
wealth and income growth, and inflation and the rate of interest. Many behavioural equations 
also include an error correction term with a small coefficient, reflecting the hypothesis that 
variables which undergo deviations from long-run trends tend to revert back to trend, but 
only gradually.  
The model is thus intended to project econometrically estimated historical trends into 
the future, within a coherent macroeconomic accounting framework augmented with 
Keynesian behavioural assumptions. By altering the residuals of the estimated parameters, 
adjusting fixed effects, or modifying the accounting structure to make particular variables 
exogenous, policy “scenarios” can then be created and analysed in which the path of the 
model diverges from the “baseline” projection in which simulations are generated purely on 
the basis of estimated parameters and past values. 
18 
 
This is the exercise performed in this paper: we contrast two policy scenarios, one in 
which we assume continued fiscal austerity, in particular, attempts by European governments 
to bring deficits and debts levels back within the limits stipulated by the EU conventions 
(austerity scenario). We contrast this with an alternative “employment-focused” scenario in 
which reflationary government expenditures and increases in private investment are 
combined to generate significant increases in aggregate demand and output growth. In 
particular, we present an analysis of the projected path of debt, deficits, and interest payments 
for both scenarios. 
While a number of other studies have produced projections of European government 
finances, to our knowledge, this is the first to do so in a fully-specified macro model in which 
GDP growth, international trade, investment and the government fiscal stance are included as 
variables. Out approach thus allows for an analysis of debt-to-GDP ratios in which both the 
numerator and the denominator are fully endogenous. 
In order to perform this analysis, we make the yield on government debt for each bloc 
exogenous, fixing rates at levels we regard as feasible. This allows us to consider the 
sustainability of debt stocks at different rates of interest and growth rates. The most important 
result that emerges from this exercise is that raising the growth rates of GDP matters more for 
debt sustainability than reducing nominal government expenditures or raising taxes—our 
expansionary scenario produces lower debt-to-GDP ratios for the European blocs, despite the 
assumption of a reversal of austerity policies. 
 
4. SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS 
This paper examines two possible alternatives for Europe, for the period to 2030. We first 
examine a baseline austerity scenario in which it is assumed that the current deflationary 
policies are maintained across Europe in an attempt to reduce debt levels. Our main 
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conclusion is that this policy approach is self-defeating: stagnating GDP outweighs the effect 
of fiscal contraction, so that the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio fails to be achieved. As an 
alternative, we consider an employment-focused scenario in which it is assumed that 
reflationary increases in government expenditure and private investment take the lead in 
driving substantial increases in GDP growth and employment. We find that this scenario, in 
addition to higher levels of GDP and employment, fiscal deficits remain close to manageable 
levels and that debt levels reduce more significantly than the austerity scenario. We now 
review the core assumptions underpinning the two scenarios under investigation. 
 
Austerity Scenario 
The baseline scenario assumes that the Eurozone will expand to include Eastern European 
countries, governments will continue to cut expenditures in an attempt to reduce budget 
deficits and bring debt-to-GDP ratios down to 60%, in line with the requirements of the 
Growth and Stability Pact. In order to achieve this, we impose targets for ratios of 
government expenditure to GDP for the various European blocs as shown in Table 3 below. It 
should be noted that this variable represents net current government spending, and thus 
excludes transfer payments such as social security and pensions. The ratios shown are thus 
considerably smaller than the gross figures usually quoted. 
In addition to cuts in government spending, we further assume that increases in 
government revenue, through rises in tax rates, are also imposed on all blocs except 
Scandinavia. We assume that government net income as a share of GDP rises to 20% of GDP 
for each bloc, from starting levels of 19% for the Core Eurozone, 17% for the Eurozone 
Periphery, 18% for the United Kingdom, and 18% for East Europe.  
In the austerity scenario we also assume that private investment will remain subdued 
in the face of sluggish GDP growth and depressed expectations of profitability, given the 
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recessionary environment. We thus adjust the fixed effects of the behavioural equations for 
investment such that real investment growth remains in the region of 1-1.5% for all of the 
European blocs. 
 
Employment-focused scenario 
We contrast our austerity scenario with an alternative set of projections in which it is assumed that the 
Eastern European countries remain outside the Eurozone, fiscal austerity is reversed and private-
sector investment reverses it’s long-term downward trend. 
 
Government expenditure and government financing  
In contrast to the austerity scenario, our employment focused scenario assumes that governments 
either maintain or even increase expenditures as a share of GDP as part of a reflationary package to 
generate the economic momentum required to substantially raise employment levels. For the 
Eurozone periphery we assume an increase in government spending from 25.4% of GDP in 2012 to 
26% in 2030. In the United Kingdom government expenditure declines much more moderately to 
24% by 2030 whilst in Scandinavia we programme an increase in government expenditure from 30% 
of GDP to 32% in 2030. For the Core Eurozone and East Europe we assume government expenditure 
remains at pre-crisis levels. Government expenditure as percentage of GDP is programmed to reach 
23% of GDP in the Core Eurozone and 22% of GDP in East Europe by 2030. 
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Table 3. Government expenditure % of GDP: 2030 targets austerity and employment-focused scenarios 
 
2012 
Rate 
Scenarios 
Austerity  
Scenario 
2030 target 
Employment-focused 
scenario 
2030 target 
Core Eurozone 24.6 23 23 
Eurozone periphery 25.4 19 26 
East Europe 24.6 20 22 
Scandinavia 29.8 31 32 
United Kingdom 26.0 21 24 
 
In light of the debt levels currently facing European governments, we do not assume that 
fiscal expansion is implemented through tax cuts. Rather we assume modest increases in 
government revenues as a share of GDP, to partially offset the deficit-increasing effects of 
expenditures.  In the Eurozone Periphery and East Europe we impose a target increase in 
government revenue to 22% of GDP. In the Core Eurozone and in the United Kingdom 
government revenue is set to increase to increase to 24%. Given the favourable debt position 
in Scandinavia, we assume government revenue will marginally reduce by one percent from 
post-crisis peaks of 33% in 2013. 
Given the inbuilt imbalances of the Eurozone, the financing of reflationary 
government expenditures, particularly in the peripheral countries, presents significant issues. 
We include in our scenario two mechanisms by which will serve to offset these problems. 
Firstly, we assume a significant increase in the role of the European Union budget. In 
particular, we assume that the EU budget will increase gradually from the present level of 
around 1 percent of total EU GDP to a level of 4% by 2021.  
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The primary intent of such an EU budget expansion is to allocate substantially more 
investment funds to the Eurozone Periphery on the basis of fiscal transfers from surplus 
countries, primarily those of the Core Eurozone. These fiscal transfers provide a mechanism 
by which counteract the underlying structural asymmetry of the currency union. 
Contributions and receipts to the enlarged budget are structured such that Eurozone Periphery 
and East Europe receive significant net fiscal transfers, while the Core Eurozone and the 
United Kingdom increase their net contributions. We are acutely aware the political 
feasibility of even such moderate moves towards greater Federalism is slim. However, we are 
interested in this exercise to analyse the economic requirements for stabilisation of the 
Eurozone. 
The second aspect of the financing of government debt is an assumption that debt 
above 60% of GDP of the Eurozone Periphery in 2015 will be pooled in a common EU debt 
redemption. It is assumed that repayment of this debt remains the obligation of the country of 
issue, but that through joint issuance, the yield demanded by holders of this debt can be 
reduced below the rates that would otherwise be demanded. We assume that this debt can be 
issued at real interest rates of 2% per annum over the period to 2030. Regarding the debt 
issued directly be the governments of each bloc we assume real interest rates as shown in 
Table 4 in both scenarios.6 Since the rate of interest on pooled debt is likely to be above the 
yields demanded on the debt of the Core Eurozone, we assume that this bloc will not add its 
own debt above the 60% threshold to the pooled debt. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Predicting market rates of interest over a long forward time horizon is extremely tenuous. We thus choose to make interest 
rates fully exogenous for the current exercise. It might be argued that real interest rates should be lower in the austerity-
driven scenario. However, while nominal yields may be lower, we would also expect inflation to be lower. Further, as shown 
later in the paper, debt-to-GDP ratios are projected to be higher in the austerity scenario. 
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Table 4. Assumed long-term interest rates 
 Interest rate (%) 
Scandinavia 1.5 
Core Eurozone 1.5 
United Kingdom 1.5 
Pooled EZ debt 2.0 
Eurozone Periphery 3.0 
East Europe 3.5 
 
Private investment and saving 
It is clear that reflationary government policies, while an essential element in any Europe-
wide recovery, cannot play the only role. In particular, private investment will need to rise 
significantly from the woefully low levels to which it has plummeted in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. Even setting aside the post-crisis collapse in investment, most 
European blocs have experienced a secular trend of falling investment as a share of GDP over 
the last 30 years or so. In assuming that both government expenditures and private investment 
can simultaneously rise, we reject the “crowding out” hypothesis. Instead we regard targeted 
government expenditures as playing a stimulation role by raising output and raising 
expectations of profitability. In terms of the financing, we assume that government has a role 
to play in shaping the institutional framework so that private credit extension will support the 
expansion of investment. There are a number of current proposals in this direction, that 
propose support for investment by enhancing the role of the European investment bank and 
implementing strategic structural policies (see e.g. Griffith Jones et al. 2012).  
We target increases in investment growth most strongly in the five-year period 2015-
2020, with more modest growth rates in the subsequent periods. Table 5 summarises the 
relative strength of the increases in investment growth assumed in the employment-focused 
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scenario, in comparison with the predicted effects in continued austerity. Increases in real 
investment growth are targeted most strongly in the Eurozone Periphery and the United 
Kingdom, with more modest, yet strong, effects in the Core Eurozone and East Europe, and 
moderate changes in Scandinavia. 
Table 5. Average annual investment growth (%), 2014-2019, scenarios compared 
 Austerity  
Scenario 
Employment-focused 
scenario 
Core Eurozone -0.17 1.54 
Eurozone Periphery -1.80 3.30 
East Europe 0.52 1.17 
Scandinavia 0.85 1.41 
United Kingdom 0.87 3.78 
 
In addition to increases in private investment, the employment-focused scenario also assumes 
some loosening of the wage repression which has played a central role in the beggar-my-
neighbour policies of the Core Eurozone. The increase of wage rises is captured by adjusting 
the fixed effects of the saving function in this bloc so to reflect the higher propensity to 
consume out of wage income than profit income As well as providing a direct domestic 
demand stimulus, wage increases in the Core Eurozone will also increase import demand, and 
will thus serve to reduce the tendency towards trade surpluses.  
 
Real exchange rates  
The scenario also assumes changes in the real exchange rate for the three blocs which are not 
part of the Eurozone: the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and East Europe. The United 
Kingdom has long suffered from an overvalued exchange rate, a phenomenon often attributed 
to the dominance of the City of London at the expense of the manufacturing sector. We thus 
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assume a steady depreciation of the pound against the US dollar of around 15%. Given the 
assumption that East European countries do not join the Eurozone, it is projected that the real 
exchange rate of East Europe will decline, at least initially. Finally, given the relatively 
strong position of the Core European bloc, the relative exchange rate of these countries 
experiences significant pressure to appreciate. 
 
 
5. SCENARIO PROJECTIONS 
 
In this section we present the projections produced by the CAM under the assumptions 
described for each of the two scenarios. 
 
Private Investment 
Table 6 shows the per-annum growth rate of private investment shown as an average of each 
five-year period from 1984-2013. It also shows the projected growth rates of investment 
generated by each of our two scenarios. It can be seen that a significant push in private 
investment is assumed in the Eurozone Periphery in the period 2014-2018 in our 
employment-focused scenario, with average growth of 3.6%, and in the United Kingdom, 
with growth of 3.8%. But otherwise, the growth rates projected in this scenario are not 
particularly dramatic, averaging between 1% and 2% per annum. However, these rates are 
considerably higher than those projected for the austerity scenario, at least in the initial period 
when the CAM projects negative investment growth in the Eurozone and below 1% 
elsewhere except for Scandinavia at 1%. In the later period, the projected investment rates 
return to more moderate levels, and even fall below the growth rates projected in the austerity 
scenario in some blocs.  
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Table 6. Private investment growth, % pa, 5-year avg. (2014-2030, 7-year average) 
 
Scenario 
1984-
1988 
1989-
1993 
1994-
1998 
1999-
2003 
2004-
2008 
2009-
2013 
2014-
2018 
2019-
2023 
2024-
2030 
Scandinavia historical 0.96% 
-
7.50% 3.47% -2.59% 2.96% -1.77%       
 
austerity 
      
1.03% -0.24% -0.28% 
 employment       1.55% 0.58% 0.30% 
Core 
Eurozone historical 0.32% 
-
0.92% -0.18% -2.19% 1.73% -2.52%       
 
austerity 
      
-0.40% 0.78% 0.32% 
 employment       1.47% 1.59% 1.05% 
Eurozone 
Periphery historical -0.99% 
-
3.26% 1.49% 1.43% 0.21% -7.93%       
 
austerity 
      
-2.35% 1.19% 1.24% 
 employment       3.64% 1.42% 0.52% 
East Europe historical -0.50% 
-
5.20% 4.31% -3.03% 2.42% -7.04%       
 
austerity 
      
0.36% 1.23% 1.19% 
  employment             1.23% 0.70% 0.36% 
United 
Kingdom historical 3.98% 
-
6.07% 3.13% -2.37% -0.63% -5.49%       
 
austerity 
      
0.64% 1.96% 1.73% 
  employment             4.02% 2.04% 1.08% 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the result of these growth rates on the share of GDP going to investment in 
each bloc. In the Eurozone Periphery there is a very significant increase to about 19% as 
early as 2020. This result contrasts with that of the austerity scenario, in which private 
investment increase to only around 14% of GDP by 2030. 
The Core Eurozone and the United Kingdom also achieve significant increases in the 
share of GDP going to investment. In the United Kingdom, private investment in 2012 is at 
an extremely low level of 11.4% and reaches 15% by 2020 and 17% by 2030, in the Core 
Eurozone private investment increases from 15% of GDP in 2012 to 18% in 2020 and 20% in 
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2030. In Scandinavia and in East Europe private investment as percentage of GDP is also 
projected to increase over the period under investigation. 
 
Figure 1. Private Investment as % of GDP 
 
 
 
Government expenditure and income 
The employment focused scenario assumes that government expenditures, as a share of GDP, 
are maintained at levels close to those seen in the period before the onset of the global 
financial crisis. In the case of the Eurozone Periphery, a significant increase is assumed. 
Table 7 summarises the data on the growth of government spending (in real terms), 
showing historical data and projected growth rates in each of our scenarios. As with the 
investment growth figures, the growth rates projected in our employment-focused scenarios 
are not high in historical context. Rather the figures projected in the austerity scenario are 
lower than the historical trend. As with the investment growth rates the difference between 
the two scenarios is most marked for the United Kingdom and the Eurozone Periphery. 
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
27.5
30.0
80 90 00 10 20 30
Scandinavia
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
27.5
30.0
80 90 00 10 20 30
Core Eurozone
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
27.5
30.0
80 90 00 10 20 30
Eurozone Periphery
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
27.5
30.0
80 90 00 10 20 30
East Europe
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
27.5
30.0
80 90 00 10 20 30
Austerity scenario
Employment-focused scenario
United Kingdom
Private Investment % of GDP
28 
 
Table 7. Growth of government spending, % pa, (2011-2030, 5 years average) 
 
 
Scenario 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 
2011-
2015 2016-2020 2021-2025 
2026-
2030 
Scandinavia Historical 1.76% 2.62% 2.09% 2.78% 3.09% 3.16% 3.02%       
 
Austerity 
       
1.62% 1.55% 1.43% 
 Employment        2.75% 2.58% 2.54% 
Core Eurozone Historical 1.83% 2.57% 2.74% 1.71% 1.68% 2.28% 0.15%       
 
Austerity 
       
0.96% 0.74% 0.45% 
 Employment        1.27% 1.92% 1.96% 
Eurozone 
Periphery Historical 4.71% 5.64% 0.42% 3.50% 3.98% 1.63% -4.33%       
 
Austerity 
       
-1.32% 0.83% 1.35% 
 Employment        2.96% 2.76% 2.39% 
East Europe Historical 1.39% 1.43% 0.33% 3.02% 5.78% 5.18% 0.57%       
 
Austerity 
       
0.51% 2.23% 2.90% 
 Employment        2.97% 3.30% 2.42% 
United Kingdom Historical 1.52% 2.39% 1.46% 2.36% 5.20% 3.60% -2.80%       
 
Austerity 
       
-0.40% 1.07% 1.42% 
 Employment        1.56% 2.36% 2.85% 
 
29 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the result of these growth rates on government expenditure as a share of 
GDP, as outlined in the scenario assumptions in the previous section. In the Core Eurozone 
the ratio of government expenditures to GDP slightly declines from 24% of GDP to 23% of 
GDP where it is maintained throughout 2021-2030. Similarly, in East Europe government 
spending marginally declines to 22% of GDP by 2017 where it remains till 2030. In the 
United Kingdom government spending is maintained at 24% of GDP throughout the period 
under investigation. For the Eurozone Periphery government expenditure is maintained at 
25% of GDP until 2030 whilst in Scandinavia government expenditure is increased to 32% of 
GDP. 
 
Figure 2. Government expenditure as % of GDP 
 
 
The situation with government revenues is complicated by the introduction of the additional 
European budget contributions and receipts. Table 8 summarises the effect of the proposed 
enlargement of the European budget on the net government receipts of each bloc. The total 
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contributions shown sum to an additional 3% of total EU GDP, in addition to the current 1% 
budget size. The difference between contributions and receipts at the bloc level gives the 
result that the Eurozone Periphery and East Europe become net recipients of between 2.5% 
and 3.0% of domestic GDP. 
 
Table 8. Summary of fiscal contributions, receipts and net fiscal transfer, PPP $ and % of GDP 
  2015 2020 2030 
  EAST EUROPE   
Total GDP  1,974.00 2,424.00 3,265.60 
EU budget contributions  45.4 100.6 144.8 
EU budget receipts 82.9 169.6 228.7 
Net receipts 37.6 69.1 83.9 
Net receipts as % of GDP 1.9 2.8 2.6 
  EUROZONE PERIPHERY   
Total GDP 3,758.70 4,381.90 5,559.00 
EU budget contributions 25.4 53.2 67.9 
EU budget receipts 84.6 177.2 232.1 
Net receipts 59.3 123.9 164.2 
Net receipts as % of GDP 1.6 2.8 3.0 
  CORE EUROZONE   
Total GDP 6,726.90 7,353.10 8,903.10 
EU budget contributions 137.1 272.7 326.6 
EU budget receipts 85.6 172 187.7 
Net receipts -51.5 -100.7 -138.8 
Net receipts as % of GDP -0.8 -1.4 -1.6 
  UK     
Total GDP 2,148.60 2,367.00 3,032.90 
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EU budget contributions 34.3 66.2 79.7 
EU budget receipts 27.1 56.2 65 
Net receipts -7.2 -10 -14.7 
Net receipts as % of GDP -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
    
  SCANDINAVIA     
Total GDP 1,019.00 1,124.20 1,432.80 
EU budget contributions 17.6 34.7 43.2 
EU budget receipts 9.4 19.2 23.6 
Net receipts -8.2 -15.5 -19.6 
Net receipts as % of GDP -0.8 -1.4 -1.4 
 
 
Figure 3 incorporates these net balances to show the projected government revenues as a 
percentage of GDP in each of the two scenarios. For the employment-focused scenario, two 
series are included: one showing government revenue including and the other excluding net 
fiscal transfers. Thus, for the Core Eurozone, net government income is assumed to rise from 
20% of GDP to 24%, with around a third of the additional revenues representing net 
contributions to the EU budget. Similarly, government revenues in the Eurozone Periphery 
are assumed to rise by about by around 2% of GDP, but net transfers from the EU budget 
increase total revenues to around 25% of GDP. 
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Figure 3. Government income as % of GDP 
 
 
 
The projected government expenditures and revenues combine to produce net fiscal positions 
in each of the blocs as shown in Table 8. In general fiscal deficits are projected to reduce to 
levels below -1% of GDP by 2030 in the employment focused scenario. Thus, this scenario 
cannot be dismissed on the basis of promoting fiscal profligacy. Table 9 shows the fiscal 
balances of each bloc plus its corresponding net fiscal transfers to/from the EU which 
gradually starts in 2013.  
Given that the Eurozone Periphery is a major recipient of federal fiscal transfers its 
fiscal deficit is projected to fall progressively to around -0.7% of GDP by 2030. The fiscal 
deficit for East Europe, which is also a net recipient of fiscal transfers, is projected to turn 
positive by 2018 and reach 2% of GDP by 2030. 
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Table 8. Fiscal balance in employment-focused scenario, 2005 PPP Euro and % of GDP 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
  Percent of GDP 
Scandinavia 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
Core Eurozone -3.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 
Eurozone Periphery -4.7 -1.4 -0.9 -0.7 
East Europe -2.1 1.0 1.1 2.0 
United Kingdom -5.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 
  2005 PPP Euros 
 
2015 2020 2025 2030 
Scandinavia 7038 -1057 -4329 -5194 
Core Eurozone -216301 -60519 -37805 -50631 
Eurozone Periphery -179299 -59954 -46371 -41095 
East Europe -42425 24878 31771 63393 
United Kingdom -106016 -25924 -11948 -15277 
 
Table 9. Fiscal balances and net fiscal transfers as % of GDP 
  2013 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Fiscal balance (% GDP) -4.9 -0.8 -0.6 
Net fiscal transfer (% 
GDP) 
-0.5 -1.4 -1.6 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Fiscal balance (% GDP) -7.4 -1.4 -0.7 
Net fiscal transfer (% 
GDP) 
0.9 2.8 3.0 
East Europe Fiscal balance (% GDP) -4.9 1.0 2.0 
Net fiscal transfer (% 1.1 2.8 2.6 
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GDP) 
United Kingdom Fiscal balance (% GDP) -8.5 -1.1 -0.5 
Net fiscal transfer (% 
GDP) 
-0.2 -0.4 -0.5 
Scandinavia Fiscal balance (% GDP) 2.1 -0.1 -0.4 
Net fiscal transfer (% 
GDP) 
-0.5 -1.4 -1.4 
 
 
Figure 4 shows how much of these fiscal balances are accounted for by interest payments, 
given our assumptions about the yields on government debt. In particular, the figure 
highlights the significant savings – around 0.5% of GDP – that could be achieved by the 
lowering of yields that come with debt pooling for the Eurozone Periphery. 
 
Figure 4. Interest Payments as % of GDP 
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Economic Growth 
Before examining the outcomes of the two scenarios in terms of government debt ratios, we 
first present the project values for economic growth. Table 10 summarises the projected GDP 
growth rates for each scenario. The economic growth rates for the austerity scenario are listed 
in parenthesis for each bloc. Growth rates are projected to be between 0.75% and 1.5% higher 
across the blocs, in when compared to the projections of the austerity scenario, although there 
is variance across the blocs: Scandinavia’s performance is projected to be only modestly 
better than it would achieve under the austerity scenario. In contrast, East Europe is projected 
to achieve high rates of growth: 3.6% during 2013-2020 and 3.4% during 2021-2030.  
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Table 10. Average GDP growth (%) 
  
2008-2012 
(actual) 
2013-2020 2021-2030 
Core Eurozone  1.23 
2.17 1.90 
1.45 0.92 
Eurozone Periphery -1.40 
2.83 2.38 
-0.74 1.34 
East Europe  1.46 
3.57 3.48 
2.62 3.08 
Scandinavia  0.21 
2.15 2.24 
1.73 1.28 
United Kingdom  -0.51 
2.25 2.79 
0.47 1.58 
 
 
 
Government Debt 
We now turn to the outcomes in terms of government debt levels. The outcomes of each of 
the two scenarios are shown in Figure 5. This Figure additionally provides a breakdown of 
the projected debt levels of the Eurozone Periphery into pooled and non-pooled debt.  
The debt outcomes diverge considerably across the two scenarios. It is very clear that, 
within the modelling framework adopted here, the achievement of 60% debt-to-GDP ratios 
through austerity measures is not achievable for the Eurozone countries or the United 
Kingdom. In our austerity scenario, the United Kingdom reaches 2030 with debt levels 
around 120% of GDP, Core Eurozone with around 100% of GDP and the Eurozone Periphery 
over 150%. These estimates might seem extremely pessimistic, but out results clearly 
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demonstrate the powerful negative effects of economic stagnation on debt-to-GDP ratios, as 
is most clearly demonstrated by the example of Japan. Indeed commentators are now openly 
discussing the possibility of decades of Japan-style stagnation for Europe 
While debt levels are projected to also remain high in our employment-focused 
scenario, the picture is considerably better than that shown in the austerity scenario. As a 
result of the trends in government expenditure and revenue, as well as the acceleration in 
economic growth after 2012, government debt falls is projected to fall appreciably in all five 
European blocs beginning roughly after 2015. In this scenario, the Core Eurozone is 
projected to achieve the target of 60% debt-to-GDP – despite the net fiscal transfers – while 
the debt ratio in the United Kingdom reaches around 80% by 2030. Debt levels are projected 
to remain high in the Eurozone Periphery, at around 120%, but around half of this debt is 
pooled, reducing interest rates and sheltering governments from pressure from the bond 
markets. 
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Figure 5. Government debt as % of GDP 
 
 
 
The Trade Balance 
Since the five European blocs are projected to growth primarily on the basis of stimulating 
government expenditure and private investment, there exists a danger of deterioration in their 
trade balances as a result of increased import demand. Table 8 shows the trends in the trade 
balance and compares these to changes in the real exchange rate for each of the five blocs. 
The real exchange rate of each bloc is presented as a ratio to the real exchange rate of the 
United States, which remains comparatively flat throughout the projected period to 2030. 
There is indeed a reduction in the substantial trade surpluses of both the Core Eurozone 
and Scandinavia as the real exchange rate of both blocs appreciate. Although the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate of Scandinavia is contained in the employment focused scenario, 
nevertheless, its rate still appreciates by 16% percent relative to its 2013 levels. There is a 
sharper appreciation of 27% in the real exchange rate of the Core Eurozone. However, both 
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blocs still continue to run modest trade surpluses throughout the period to 2030. The 
depreciation of the British pound by 15% also helps this bloc to progressive reduce its trade 
deficit from about -2.3% to -1.8% by 2030.   
 
Table 7. Trade balance as % of GDP and the real exchange rate 
  2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Trade balance 2.9 3.1 1.6 
Real exchange rate 1.10 1.28 1.40 
Eurozone Periphery Trade balance -0.2 -0.9 -2.8 
Real exchange rate 0.97 1.02 1.08 
East Europe Trade balance -0.9 5.1 2.9 
Real exchange rate 0.61 0.56 0.71 
United Kingdom Trade balance -2.3 -3.0 -1.8 
Real exchange rate 1.00 0.98 0.85 
Scandinavia Trade balance 4.9 1.3 1.1 
Real exchange rate 1.37 1.65 1.59 
 
The Eurozone Periphery begins to experience worsening trade deficits after about 2020. This 
trend coincides with an appreciation of its real exchange rate of about 11% between 2013 and 
2030. In East Europe, an initial depreciation is predicted which reverses as a result of the 
positive economic performance projected for the bloc. 
 
Employment 
Finally, the primary aim of our scenario is to generate a recovery in Europe which raises 
employment levels significantly. Table 8 compares the total number of jobs created in each 
bloc under each of the two scenarios. The projected increase in total employment under the 
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employment-focused scenario is significantly greater than that of the austerity scenario. The 
combination of expansionary national and federal policies leads to significant job creation. 
The Eurozone Periphery, the main recipient of federal fiscal transfers, is projected to generate 
an additional 4.8 million jobs by 2020, in comparison to the outcome in the austerity 
scenario. Significant gains are also projected for the Core Eurozone and in the United 
Kingdom. Under the employment-focused scenario, the Core Eurozone is projected to 
generate an additional 4.2 million jobs by 2030 while in the United Kingston 2.4 million 
additional jobs are projected. Employment gains are also achieved in Scandinavia and East 
Europe. 
Table 8. Core Eurozone: Total employment (in millions) generated under the two scenarios, 
selected years 
  Scenario 2000 2008 2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Scandinavia historical 11.41 12.37 12.25 
   
 
 
austerity 
   
12.48 12.57 12.58 12.54 
 
Employment 
  
12.51 12.72 12.87 13.06 
  Difference       0.04 0.15 0.29 0.53 
Core Eurozone Historical 79.08 85.65 86.29 
   
 
 
Austerity 
   
86.49 87.43 86.79 85.28 
 
Employment 
  
87.82 89.34 89.68 89.44 
  difference       1.33 1.91 2.88 4.16 
Eurozone Periphery historical 47.72 55.81 52.80 
   
 
 
austerity 
   
51.36 51.38 51.84 52.39 
 
Employment 
  
54.22 56.22 57.75 58.95 
  difference       2.87 4.84 5.91 6.56 
East Europe historical 45.11 46.60 46.31 
   
 
 
austerity 
   
46.63 46.74 46.78 46.89 
 
employment 
  
46.70 47.48 48.06 47.96 
  Difference       0.06 0.75 1.28 1.06 
United Kingdom Historical 27.29 29.22 28.91 
   
 
 
Austerity 
   
28.68 28.64 28.74 28.98 
 
employment 
  
29.63 30.18 30.72 31.41 
  difference       0.95 1.54 1.98 2.43 
41 
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of our modelling of policy-relevant future scenarios for Europe has been to 
gauge the viability of a strategy of promoting employment-focused economic recovery and 
contrast its outcomes to those produced by the current alternative of persisting with austerity 
measures. The time horizon for our scenarios has been 2013-2030. 
Our conclusion is that such a strategy is indeed feasible but it requires greater 
intervention by the European Union. For out employment-focused scenario, this intervention 
implies substantially more EU funding of public investment, a greater EU budget, greater 
lending for private investment and a strong debt redemption mechanism for the heavily 
indebted countries in the Eurozone Periphery. 
At the bloc level, this strategy explicitly gears a range of policy measures to 
promoting employment as their overriding objective. These policies include maintaining 
government expenditures, especially public investment, at the pre-crisis levels, and closing 
any ensuing fiscal deficits by raising government revenue above its low crisis-induced levels. 
The emphasis on public investment at bloc level is designed to help stimulate private 
investment, which has languished at pitifully low levels across the continent. 
The results generated by our employment-focused scenario are generally more 
impressive, particularly in contrast to the bleak prospects being produced by the strategy of 
protracted austerity. Most importantly, employment reaches historically high levels, and 
economic growth rates rise well above the current rates that are hovering close to zero 
percent in most European blocs, as well as above the similarly low projected rates under the 
austerity scenario. 
A rise in private investment is partially responsible for overcoming the stagnation in 
economic growth. However, more concreted policy initiatives will have to be undertaken to 
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lift private investment back up to its pre-crisis levels. Such an initiative could play an 
important part in raising economic growth rates consistently above 3% through 2030. 
As a result of trends in government expenditures and revenues and of the fiscal 
transfers at EU levels fiscal deficits are close to manageable levels. Also, most importantly, 
debt-to-GDP levels plummet across the five blocs. Of course, the Eurozone Periphery 
benefits almost immediately from the mutualisation of debt above 60% of GDP as interest 
rate payments significantly reduce. But accelerating economic growth also plays a major role 
in decreasing debt burden across the continent. 
The expansionary fiscal places implied by this scenario do not lead to major trade 
deficits. But the blocs historically sizeable trade surpluses, such as the Core Eurozone and 
Scandinavia, do experience a secular decline in their surplus position. In general, the blocs 
outside the Eurozone, including Scandinavia as well as East Europe and the United Kingdom, 
are obliged to undertake measures to depreciate their real exchange rate or contain, at least, 
its appreciation. 
In conclusion, achieving significant increases in GDP and employment across Europe 
will not be easy, but it is certainly attainable. However, it will imply a move away from 
austerity policies and the implementation of a range of expansionary macroeconomic policies 
at both the country and the EU-wide level. These initiatives imply that the European Union 
will have to become a more coordinated and more progressive-minded economic bloc.  
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